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ABSTRACT: The article addresses the question of how should scientific peers revise their beliefs (if at 
all) upon recognized disagreement. After presenting the basics of peer disagreement in sections 1 and 2, 
we focus, in section 3, on a concrete case of scientific disagreement, to wit, the dispute over the evidential 
status of randomized control trials in medical practice. The examination of this case motivates the idea 
that some scientific disagreements permit a steadfast reaction. In section 4, we support this conclusion by 
providing a normative argument in the same direction; if we are correct, typical reasons for conciliation 
are absent in this kind of scientific disagreements.
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1. Introduction
There is something puzzling about the role of disagreement in scientific practice. On the 
one hand, the proliferation of rival hypothesis and theories can be thought of as a condi-
tion for the growth of scientific knowledge. On the other hand, science seems to be the 
most suitable area of human activity for the development of stable, long-lasting agreement.1 
However, this might not be as problematic as it seems. Most scientific disagreements are 
factual disagreements about propositions we consider to be empirically vulnerable; be they 
empirical or theoretical disagreements, we can rely on current or future empirical evidence 
for their resolution.2 This is obvious in the former case, and reasons rooted in the empir-
icist tradition make it plausible in the second, at least for philosophers with realist intu-
itions. However, this picture of science has been questioned on several grounds, some of 
them related to the possibility of disagreements that are not empirically decidable (as in 
cases of underdetermination of theories by the data).
In parallel, disagreement has been thoroughly discussed by epistemologists. Recently, 
the debate has focused on peer disagreement. The problem can be roughly stated as follows. 
Consider two subjects, A and B, who disagree with respect to a given proposition P.3 In ad-
dition, assume that A and B are epistemic peers, i.e. they are both cognitive and evidential 
equals (Lackey, 2010, p. 302). Finally, imagine a situation of full disclosure where both A 
and B know that they disagree and that they are epistemic peers. The question then arises: 
how should A (or B) revise her doxastic attitudes towards P (if at all) in light of the new ev-
idence? Should A (or B) change her mind after having learned that an epistemic peer disa-
grees with her regarding some topic? Very roughly, there are two kinds of answers: steadfast 
views maintain that agents are rationally permitted to retain their doxastic attitudes, while 
conciliatory views contend that they should significantly modified their opinions.4
In this article, we aim at connecting both debates, in the hope that a close examination 
of the nature of scientific disagreements will bring light into the dispute over peer disagree-
ment. More specifically, we present and characterize, through a concrete example, a specific 
kind of scientific disagreements, namely disagreements between scientists having different 
fundamental epistemic perspectives, and we provide a normative argument for a steadfast 
1 Although some radical anti-realist views on science question the existence of stable agreement through 
the history of science.
2 This claim becomes highly controversial in the case of formal sciences. Consider mathematics. First, 
not everybody would agree on characterizing mathematical disagreements as factual. Second, even 
among the ones who do think that mathematical disagreements are factual (say, Millian empiricists 
and platonists), there is no consensus about mathematical propositions being empirically vulnerable. 
And the same runs for logic, perhaps with extra complications. For these reasons, our characterization 
of scientific disagreement is focused on natural and social sciences, even when we believe the frame-
work that we put forward in this article can account for disagreements in formal sciences too.
3 We set aside disagreements concerning evaluative matters, a topic that has been the subject of inten-
sive debate within philosophy of language in recent years. For an interesting discussion of the connec-
tion between the two debates see Carter (2014).
4 There are other possibilities. Kelly (2010) defends the Total Evidence View, according to which one 
should answer the aforementioned questions on a case by case basis depending on the import of one’s 
total evidence. For his part, Christensen (2010) maintains that these situations generate an epistemic 
dilemma where neither answer is completely satisfactory, for both fall short of some rational ideal.
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view. The article is structured as follows: in the next section we discuss peer disagreement. 
After presenting what we take to be the main motivation for adopting a conciliatory view, 
we lay out two standard arguments in its favor. In addition, we discuss some assumptions 
often made within the epistemological debate over peer disagreement and we compare our 
own way of framing the debate on these issues with some recent alternative proposals. In 
section 3, we turn to scientific disagreement. We focus on a concrete case in order to moti-
vate the idea that some scientific disagreements permit a steadfast reaction. Finally, in sec-
tion 4, we provide a normative argument in favor of this view, by showing that in the rele-
vant cases standard reasons for conciliation are absent.
2. Peer disagreement
2.1. The argument for conciliationism
As we said, there are mainly two types of views on peer disagreement. Conciliatory views 
maintain that peer disagreement always prescribes a significant degree of doxastic revi-
sion. According to steadfast views, in turn, there are circumstances in which one is ration-
ally allowed to retain one’s attitude in the face of peer disagreement. In a nutshell, the main 
thrust behind conciliationism is that recognized peer disagreement provides the subject 
defeating higher-order evidence (viz. evidence concerning the existence or the import of 
first-order evidence) that her original evaluation of the first-order evidence is mistaken.5 
As a consequence, she ought to reduce the level of confidence in her belief or, alternatively, 
suspend judgment on the matter.
There are at least two different ways of implementing this basic idea. One might think 
of epistemic peerhood in terms of rationality: on this view, an epistemic peer is “one whose 
opinion is equally likely to be rational” (Christensen, 2016, p. 586). Alternatively, one 
might characterize epistemic peerhood in terms of accuracy. Thus understood, an epis-
temic peer is “one whose opinion on the disputed issue one expects to be as likely to be ac-
curate as one’s own” (Christensen, 2016, p. 586). Each view makes for a different argument 
in favor of conciliationism.
If one takes the first option, the basic conciliationist insight can be restated as follows: 
disagreement with an epistemic peer constitutes higher-order evidence that the agent’s 
original evaluation of her first-order evidence was irrational, hence she ought to revise her 
original attitude. The conclusion relies upon some assumptions. The first one was already 
noted: prima facie, the agent is not justified in believing that her opponent is more likely 
than her to have formed an irrational belief, since they are epistemic peers. The second one 
is that in assessing the likelihood of her peer having formed a rational belief the agent ought 
not rely upon her own reasoning on the disputed matter. This requirement is known as the 
principle of Independence:
5 There is a difference between typical undercutting defeaters and the kind of defeating that is presum-
ably going on in cases of peer disagreement. An undercutting defeater is evidence that, once added to 
your original evidence, turns your previously rational belief irrational. By contrast, peer disagreement 
provides higher-order evidence that that your original belief was not rational to begin with (cf. Laso-
nen-Aarnio (2014)).
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Independence In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another person’s belief about P, to 
determine how (if at all) to modify one’s own belief about P, one should do so in a way that is in-
dependent of the reasoning behind one’s own initial belief about P. (Christensen, 2009, p. 758)
The third assumption consist in the idea that the evidence supports one doxastic attitude 
toward the propositions under question. This thesis is known as Evidential Uniqueness:
Evidential Uniqueness Necessarily, for any proposition P and body of evidence E, there is 
some doxastic attitude D such that, for any subject S, if E is S’s total evidence, then it is rational 
for S to have D towards P and irrational for S to have any contrary doxastic attitude toward P. 
(Lee, 2013, p. 164)
First, Evidential Uniqueness implies that in a case of peer disagreement the opponents can-
not both have equally rational beliefs. Second, since they are peers, each one is as likely to 
be rational as the other. Finally, by Independence neither can rely upon her own reasoning 
in order to evaluate whether it is her rival who has formed an irrational attitude. Given all 
of this, each agent has higher-order evidence that maybe it is her who made a mistake, and 
this evidence defeats her initial belief. Hence, they must conciliate.6, 7
Let’s turn to the second alternative. An argument in this line is provided by Cohen 
(2013). He argues that after learning of the existence of a peer disagreement the agent 
obtains evidence that there is an alternative rational line of reasoning that leads to a dif-
ferent conclusion. If we grant to the steadfast that Evidential and Doxastic Uniqueness 
are false (or at least very controversial), this fact does not constitute evidence that her 
belief is irrational. However, Cohen argues, it still constitutes evidence that her belief 
is inaccurate, since she cannot assume that her peer’s alternative reasoning is less accu-
rate than her own. This evidence functions similarly to a rebutting defeater, although for 
graded beliefs.8 So even if the agent does not have evidence that her belief is irrational, 
6 As Ballantyne & Coffman (2012) and Lee (2013) have shown, Evidential Uniqueness is sufficient but 
not necessary for the argument. Conciliationism can be secured by adopting the thesis that agents can-
not know that a body of evidence is permissive while believing one of the attitudes that the evidence 
permits. Cohen makes a similar point, relying on what he calls Doxastic Uniqueness:
Doxastic Uniqueness A subject cannot rationally believe there are two (or more) rational 
credences [or doxastic attitudes] for [a hypothesis] H on [the evidence] E, while rationally hold-
ing either. (Cohen, 2013, p. 101)
However, Ballantyne and Cofmann show that rejecting Evidential Uniqueness while maintaining that 
agents cannot know that the evidence is permissive results in a very controversial and unintuitive view. 
Something analogous could be said of the view that results by substituting Doxastic Uniqueness for 
Evidential Uniqueness, unless it is supplemented by an additional argument, as Cohen does (see dis-
cussion below).
7 In order to block the argument some defenders of the steadfast view reject Evidential Uniqueness in 
favor of a permissive account of evidence (Douven (2009); Kelly (2010, 2013)), while others argue 
against Independence (Lackey (2010, 2013); Pittard (2019); Sosa (2010)). Our view aligns with the 
latter group (see section 4 below).
8 Cohen relies on Joyce’s [1998] account of accuracy: when S assigns the level of confidence n to P 
(given 0 ≤ n ≤ 1) the accuracy of S’s doxastic attitude equals n if P is true, and 1 − n if it is false.
https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.21967 379
Learning from Scientific Disagreement
there is rational pressure related to the accuracy of her belief for her to conciliate. Cru-
cially, Cohen’s argument does not appeal to Evidential or Doxastic Uniqueness, but it 
does require Independence: were the agent justified in relying upon her own reasoning in 
evaluating the epistemic credentials of her peer’s belief, remaining steadfast would be le-
gitimate for her.
Now, in both kinds of argument the basic strategy is the same, namely to show that 
higher-order evidence from recognized peer disagreement constitutes a defeater for the 
subject’s original belief. It might be higher-order evidence that her belief is irrational or 
that it is inaccurate. In the former case, Evidential (or Doxastic) Uniqueness and Inde-
pendence are needed. In the latter, only Independence is required. As we will see in the 
next sections, however, these arguments can be blocked in some cases of scientific disagree-
ments.
2.2. Framing the debate
In the recent literature, several efforts have been made to connect the epistemological de-
bate over peer disagreement with the problem of scientific disagreement (see Straßer et al. 
(2015); Šešelja (2019); de Donato Rodríguez & Zamora Bonilla (2014); Lichtenstein 
(2020); Kelp & Douven (2012); Elgin (2010); De Cruz & De Smedt (2013)). Before mov-
ing on, it is worth pausing to highlight some important differences between our own ap-
proach and some of these views.
The debate over peer disagreement aims at answering the question, what does epis-
temic rationality require of an agent in the face of recognized disagreement with an epis-
temic peer? However, thus formulated the question could be understood in different ways, 
in relation to at least three different issues. The first one concerns the difference between 
the synchronic and the diachronic dimensions of epistemic rationality. Synchronic epis-
temic rationality concerns the mental states (we focus on beliefs or credences) that best fit 
an agent’s general epistemic situation at a given time. So, the synchronic question about 
peer disagreement concerns the beliefs or credences that are rationally required or per-
mitted for a subject given her current epistemic standing, including higher-order evidence 
stemming from peer disagreement. Diachronic epistemic rationality, in turn, is about the 
epistemic performance of an individual over time; in effect, some attitudes may be epistem-
ically rational not because they are supported by the present evidence of the subject, but be-
cause they are expected to improve her epistemic standing in the future. So, the diachronic 
question about peer disagreement concerns the best response to recognized peer disagree-
ment in the long run.
To see the point, consider the views of Kelp & Douven (2012) and Straßer et  al. 
(2015). These approaches are diachronic in nature. Kelp and Douven adopt a dynamic ap-
proach, on which disagreement is taken to be a process involving successive rounds of de-
liberation and disclosure. They maintain that scientists in a peer disagreement situation are 
justified in retaining their beliefs during the process, in so far as they commit to critically 
engage with the opposite view, and to suspend judgment if they cannot refute it. Kelp and 
 Douven contend that remaining steadfast preserves variability of judgment, which is valu-
able for scientific investigation, for it lowers the probability that every scientist ignores or 
dismisses relevant evidence, or that some theories or hypotheses are prematurely discarded. 
For their part, Straßer et al. (2015) argue for epistemic tolerance in the face of peer disa-
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greement. Epistemic tolerance is required when the agent finds the opponent’s view ob-
jectionable but still admissible, since there are indices that it is the result of rational de-
liberation. In the same vein as Kelp and Douven, Straßer et al. argue that the tension that 
tolerance sustains (between one’s assessment of the opponent’s view as incorrect and one’s 
admission of her position as potentially rational) is epistemically motivated because it pre-
vents the premature dismissal of certain theories and it forces both parties in the debate to 
seek further evidence and arguments, to find inconsistencies on the rival’s views, etc., which 
may lead to the closure of the debate. Crucially, both views make appeals to prospective 
reasons. Maintaining variability of judgment, avoiding premature dismissal of rival the-
ories, and critically engaging with incompatible theories do not concern what are the re-
quired beliefs or credences for an agent at a certain time given her total epistemic situation, 
but what is best for inquiry in the long run.
The second issue worth discussing has to do with the kind of attitude ascribed to par-
ticipants in the disagreement. Within the epistemological debate over peer disagreement, it 
is often assumed that the agents (dis)believe or suspend judgment on a given proposition, or 
alternatively, that they assign some credence to it, that is, that they have a certain degree of 
confidence in such proposition. However, one may phrase the problem in terms of another 
kind of attitude. Elgin (2010), for example, argues that we should phrase the debate in terms 
of acceptance instead of belief. This is a substantive difference, because while belief is argu-
ably involuntary, acceptance (the commitment to treat certain proposition as a premise for 
inference or as the basis for action) is not; it is, in turn, an action one decides (or not) to per-
form. One could also make appeal to other kind of attitudes, like those identified by Lacey 
(2015) within different stages of scientific practice (holding, adopting, endorsing).
In order to introduce the third and final issue we want to highlight, it will be helpful to 
briefly comment on Fleisher’s [2020] view. Fleisher points out that scientists often adopt 
an attitude of committed advocacy towards a theory despite the fact that widespread peer 
disagreement (or some other factors) makes it irrational for them to believe (or have a high 
credence) on such theory. In order to account for the rationality of scientists in those situa-
tions, he proposes to recognize the attitude of endorsement.9 Endorsement is sensible to ex-
trinsic epistemic reasons. These reasons need not be reasons to believe that a theory is true 
(for example, testability may be an extrinsic reason to endorse an hypothesis) and, crucially, 
they need not concern the epistemic performance of an individual agent but the promotion 
of healthy collective inquiry. Thus, as Fleisher points out, “there is thus a tension between 
our theory of individual epistemic rationality, and the goals of collective inquiry” (Fleisher, 
2020, p. 10).10 The same tension can be found when asking about the the most rational re-
sponse to scientific peer disagreement: one may focus on what is best in terms of individual 
epistemic rationality or, alternatively on what is best for the goals of collective inquiry.
The previous discussion makes it clear that it is possible to approach the question of 
peer disagreement from different angles, that is, by focusing on different dimensions or fac-
ets of epistemic rationality. On the one hand, one may concentrate on attitudes like accept-
ance, endorsement, etc., and ask what is the most epistemically rational course of action in 
order to promote healthy collective inquiry in the long run. On the other hand, one may be 
9 To be differentiated from Lacey’s [2015] notion of endorsement.
10 See also Šešelja (2019, §3.3).
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interested in what beliefs or credences are rationally required or permitted for an individ-
ual in virtue of her current epistemic situation. These questions are conceptually distinct 
and their answers seem to be somewhat independent. For example, endorsing a theory (in 
Fleisher’s terms) in the face of peer disagreement is compatible with being conciliatory: a 
scientist might be conciliatory w.r.t. her beliefs on a given hypothesis while continuing en-
dorsing it, for she thinks that this will better promote the goals of collective inquiry. Like-
wise, admitting the rival’s view as potentially rational (in Straßer et al.’s terms) is compat-
ible with scientists being steadfast: the latter implies retaining her belief, while the former 
means that she tolerates her rival’s view. We do not consider these approaches to be mutu-
ally exclusive, they just point to different dimensions on which we evaluate epistemic ra-
tionality. We believe that both kinds of questions raise important and interesting episte-
mological issues and are worth pursuing. In this article, however, we take an individual, 
synchronic approach to the question, in line with most of the literature on peer disagree-
ment. Within that framework, we will argue that some scientific disagreements exhibit 
characteristics that make it rational for the parties to remain steadfast. The previous discus-
sion serves to make explicit the framework within which we are working as well as the lim-
its of our argument.
3. Disagreement in science
As described by epistemologists, peer disagreement presupposes notions such as epistemic 
peer, shared evidence, evidential support, and more. Most of them are just idealizations, the-
oretically construed to analyze and test intuitions about disagreement as a general phe-
nomenon. Now, one might worry that these idealized notions cannot provide informa-
tion about such a complex phenomenon as disagreement in science. Determining what is 
the total evidence in favor or against a scientific proposition is often a hard issue, and it is 
highly unlikely that two agents share exactly the same evidence, even in seemingly unprob-
lematic contexts such as disagreements over basic empirical propositions like ‘this apple is 
red’. However, we believe that those idealizations have a role in providing knowledge about 
general features of disagreement analogous to that of idealized models in some sciences. Al-
though important details are in dispute, it is commonly accepted that an idealized model 
can provide knowledge about its target if it “captures” some of its relevant (structural and/
or qualitative) features. Likewise, working with the above mentioned idealizations can 
bring light over some interesting properties of disagreement and deepen our general under-
standing of the phenomenon. Having said that, science seems to be, among the areas of hu-
man activity, a great domain to look for instances of the idealized notions of epistemic peer, 
shared evidence, evidential support, and, of course, peer disagreement. If that is the case, con-
sidering the particularities of scientific disagreement could be very helpful to inform episte-
mologists’ current notions and to motivate new ones.11 In this section, we attempt to show 
11 It worth noting that there are also methodological advantages associated with assuming cognitive and 
evidential parity in scientific practice. On the contrary, if one regards oneself as epistemically inferior/
superior to others then one may defer to their claims with less scrutiny or reflection then may be ap-
propriate in some cases, or overlook important reasons for an alternative point of view.
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some of the relevant features of scientific disagreement in what we call The Weight of the 
Evidence Case. Then, we provide an example of an instance of that case in scientific prac-
tice.
3.1. A quick look into the nature of scientific disagreement
Disagreement is undoubtedly a moving force for science. The proliferation (and elimina-
tion) of rival theories or hypothesis about the same natural phenomenon is an essential 
part of the development of scientific knowledge. For that reason, scientific disagreement 
attracted the attention of many philosophers of science, who engaged in debates about the 
confirmation and refutation of theories and processes of theory choice. In some contexts, 
stable agreement was called into question. The historicist philosophy of science, for exam-
ple, focused on the ontological discontinuity through theory change and the radical shifts 
in the scientific image of the world. Considerations about the semantics of theoretical 
terms and the theory-ladenness of observational evidence were cited as reasons to under-
mine the possibility of stable, long-lasting agreement in science (cf. Hanson (1958); Kuhn 
(1962)).
Leaving aside their philosophical merits, these views neglect the very general and 
widely accepted intuition that science is essentially a matter of agreement (stable and gen-
eralized agreement seems to be more frequent in modern scientific enterprise than in any 
other human social activity –e.g. politics, religion, philosophy, art, etc.), a common sense 
claim that finds support in some philosophical approaches to science such as scientific real-
ism, with its view of scientific knowledge as continuous and cumulative.12 On this view, the 
empirical sciences lie close to the formal sciences, where the preeminence of stable agree-
ment is often thought to be indisputable.13
Admitting, on the one hand, that disagreement is one of the moving forces for science, 
and, on the other hand, that there is a preeminence of stable agreement in scientific prac-
tice, suggests that scientists tend to conciliate when facing peer disagreement. Plausibly, in 
real life examples scientists hardly ever conciliate by “splitting the difference,” or by pro-
portionally lowering their initial credence in the proposition under dispute. Many cases of 
scientific peer disagreement are solved by exposing some deficiencies in the way the other 
party analyzed or interpreted the evidence (which, properly done, is coherent with Inde-
pendence). When there is no reason to think that that is the case, the usual strategy for dis-
solving scientific disagreement is looking for new evidence. This is, in fact, how most scien-
tific controversies are resolved. However, even if this is not a proper conciliatory solution 
in the previously specified sense, arguably the mere act of recognizing that more evidence is 
needed is a sign of a variation in the initial doxastic attitude towards a proposition. A good 
example of this kind of situation is given by crucial experiments, that is, experiments capa-
ble of decisively determining whether or not a particular hypothesis or theory is superior to 
12 Although the common sense intuition is stronger than the realist commitment since the former (un-
like the latter) does not require the subject of the agreement to be true (or approximately true) propo-
sitions.
13 See Kornblith (2010, p. 42).
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all rival hypotheses or theories, ruling out all alternatives except the experimenter’s hypoth-
esis.
The remarks above suggest that scientists tend to conciliate when facing peer disagree-
ment. Against this preliminary intuition, we will provide reasons to support a steadfast 
view on scientific peer disagreements, based in part on a new understanding of the latter. 
The steadfast view we defend is only committed to the idea that some peer disagreements 
allow the agent to retain her opinion, so it is consistent with conciliationism being the ra-
tional response on many occasions.
There are kinds of scientific disagreement that make good candidates for a steadfast re-
action. First, consider the widely discussed cases of underdetermination of the theory by 
the evidence. We already noted the role that crucial experiments play in science: when the 
available evidence does not suffice to decide between two rival theories, crucial experiments 
provide new evidence capable of motivating a decision. But, what happens if no addition of 
new evidence could break the impasse, as in cases of underdetermination? This cases seem 
to constitute a peer disagreement in which rival scientists could not appeal to new evidence 
to decide the disagreement. Now, the usual way to motivate theory choice between empiri-
cal equivalents is to take non-empirical virtues into account, such as simplicity, parsimony, 
explanatory power, or even more aesthetic-sounding virtues, such as elegance or beauty. 
Then, in the light of the same evidence, two agents could take different doxastic attitudes 
towards a hypothesis (say, belief and rejection) based, ultimately, not on differences in the 
evaluation of such evidence, but on the fact of having divergent hierarchies of non-empiri-
cal virtues: e.g. one of them might prefer a rival hypothesis because she considers parsimony 
to be preferable over explanatory power.14 Crucially, one might think that there is not a 
uniquely rational way of weighting non-empirical virtues. If this is correct, the cases are 
such that: (a) scientists share all the available evidence; (b) they are peers; (c) they ration-
ally assess the evidence; but (d) they still disagree on their doxastic attitude towards a the-
ory or hypothesis. So, underdetermination cases provide examples of reasonable steadfast 
reactions upon disagreement.
A second kind of cases can also be found in the literature. Following Junges (2013), we 
can call it perspective of access cases. The model pluralist position concerning the units of se-
lection debate in biology (Boucher, 2014), the anthropological debate over the existence 
of cannibalistic practices (Salmon, 2000) and the debate around the theory of continen-
tal drift (Lugg, 1980; Solomon, 1992) are instances of this type. Observing the interdisci-
plinary nature of the controversy on continental drift, for example, Junges maintains that 
what explains the disagreement is that each specialist gave a little more weight to the evi-
dence coming from his field of study, considering it of greater relevance:
Thus, it is the perspective of access what explains why, at the beginning of 1960, paleomag-
netists were convinced that their data conformed to mobilism, while continental geologists re-
14 Laudan & Leplin (1991, p. 462) argued that the evidence for a hypothesis could exceed its empirical 
consequences. For example, being compatible with or deducible from a more general well-established 
theory should be regarded as evidence in favor a given hypothesis. This view is controversial, but even 
if correct, it cannot be plausibly extended to other non-empirical virtues: the simplicity of a hypoth-
esis, for example, cannot be counted as evidence in its favor. Thus, there is still room for evidential 
equivalence.
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mained ‘skeptical’ about it. Consensus only began to emerge as data from each specialty con-
formed to the continental drift hypothesis. (Junges, 2013, p. 626) (Our translation)
Differences in what he calls perspective of access to the evidence are not performance errors 
or irrational stands of the agents in relation to the evidence. They seem to be rationally ad-
missible discrepancies in the norms or policies regulating their belief-forming practices. 
Again, this type of case seems prima facie like a good candidate for advancing a steadfast 
view.
There is a third promising kind of disagreement, on which we want to focus in this ar-
ticle to make a case in support of a steadfast view. This is a kind of case in which scientists 
share evidence and are cognitive equals, but they diverge in what we will call epistemic pers-
pective (more on this notion in section 4.1).15 As De Cruz & De Smedt (2013, p. 171) put 
it, “In such cases, parties have the same epistemic goals, but they disagree on which epis-
temic principles should be used to achieve them.” In the next subsection, we present a con-
crete instance of this kind of case, and in section 4 we argue that it allows for a steadfast re-
action.
To sum up, here is a general sketch of the kind of scientific disagreement we believe 
motivates a case against the conciliatory view.
The Weight of the Evidence Case (WEC): agents S and T are in a peer disagreement situa-
tion regarding a proposition P, given evidence E. They both (correctly) assessed E in the best way 
possible. But, while S judges that E is enough evidence for believing that P, T judges that E is not 
enough evidence for believing that P, so she takes a different doxastic attitude towards P (e.g., she 
remains agnostic about it).
3.2. An instance of WEC: Evidence-Based Medicine
Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) appeared in the early nineties as a novel approach 
to clinical decision-making processes, with great success. It was even regarded as a new 
 Kuhnian paradigm in its field (Group, 1992). The very definition of EBM is a widely dis-
cussed issue, but its core claim concerns the hierarchy of evidence in favor of a treatment 
or intervention: all EBM’s proposed hierarchies give priority to Randomized Controlled 
Trials (RCT) over observational studies, mechanistic reasoning, and expert judgment (cf. 
Burns et al. (2011)). Like observational studies, RCTs are a form of comparative clinical 
studies. The main idea behind this kind of study is to determine the efficacy of an inter-
vention, e.g. an experimental treatment, comparing (at least) two groups of patients, one 
that receives the intervention and another “control” group that receives a different (stand-
ard) treatment or a placebo. Significant differences in the outcomes of the compared 
15 Although we will not argue for this point here, we believe that cases of disagreement motivated by 
underdetermination and differences in the perspectives of access are ultimately variations of dis-
agreements arising from the adoption of conflicting epistemic perspectives. Field-based variation 
in norms and epistemic policies, as well as variation as to non-empirical virtues of theories seem 
like prime candidates for differentiating the kind of belief formation framework that we label as 
the epistemic perspectives of agents. We thank an anonymous reviewer for calling our attention to 
this point.
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groups are taken as evidence of the effectiveness of the treatment, that is, the study is in-
terpreted as evidence for a causal relationship between the intervention and the outcome. 
In observational studies, the comparison is made by considering only records of (similar) 
patients that receive the standard and the experimental treatment. However, their respec-
tive allocation corresponds to the clinical decision of their doctors. In RCTs, on the other 
hand, the allocation to receive the experimental intervention or a control is totally rando-
mized. This is supposed to rule out self-selection and allocation biases, that is, the system-
atic intervention of confounding factors (i.e. those that can undermine the feasibility of 
the experimental outcome) arising from the greater probability of one specific group (e.g. 
elderly patients) to prefer the experimental treatment or be allocated to receive it by their 
doctors. Moreover, randomization allegedly neutralizes all confounders, both known and 
unknown (Sackett et al., 2000). In part for those reasons, EBM’s principles are thought to 
provide “gold standard” evidence for the effectiveness of a clinical intervention (Timmer-
mans & Berg, 2003).
There are, of course, many detractors to EBM. Their general attacks are often directed 
at (but not limited to) the following points: first, randomization is not essential for quality 
experimental evidence in medicine (Worrall, 2007a). Second, confounders are effectively 
eliminated only in large numbers, and RCTs are usually not conducted with large groups of 
patients (Worrall, 2002). Third, EBM does not account for the problem of external valid-
ity, that is, the problem of how to extrapolate the claims about the efficacy of a treatment 
within the experimental group to the general population (Cartwright, 2011; La Caze, 
2011). In fact, according to Worrall (2002, 2007a,b), of all the alleged advantages of RCTs, 
only the control of allocation biases stands up to scrutiny.
Besides being the preferred form of comparative studies, RCTs are, according to EBM, 
a much better source of evidential support than mechanistic reasoning and expert judg-
ment. So, a simplified EBM hierarchy of evidence should look like this (in every case, sys-
tematic reviews of studies are assumed to be superior to single studies): (i) RCTs, (ii) ob-
servational studies, (iii) mechanistic reasoning, and (iv) expert judgment. Having said that, 
for reasons of space we will focus on EBM’s claim that RCTs provide better evidence than 
mechanistic reasoning, and in the main arguments for and against that claim.
An interesting way to capture the idea behind mechanistic reasoning is to compare it 
with RCTs. In the latter (as in any comparative clinical study), the specific causal chain 
linking the intervention with the experimental outcome is, as far as the study is con-
cerned, a “black box”: all that matters is the correlation of the intervention and the out-
come in the relevant circumstances. In contrast, mechanistic reasoning requires opening 
the box, that is, identifying the relevant mechanism activated by the intervention that 
leads to the outcome. There are many definitions of what a mechanism is (see Craver & 
Tabery (2015)), but most of them consider mechanisms as specific arrangements/organi-
zations of parts/features that lead to regular or stable relationships between “inputs” and 
“outputs”. On these views, mechanistic reasoning is an inference from knowledge of the 
mechanisms activated by a specific intervention to certain expected outcome. There is, of 
course, much more to be said about mechanisms and mechanistic reasoning, but this suf-
fices for our present purposes. It is also worth noting that mechanistic reasoning is closely 
related to mechanistic explanation. In this context, the resulting experimental outcome is 
explained in terms of the relevant mechanism, which details what goes on inside RCT’s 
black box.
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There are many arguments for and against EBM’s claim about the superiority of RCT 
over mechanistic reasoning. The most philosophically interesting defenses of EBM’s hierar-
chy point out alleged deficiencies in mechanistic reasoning. Most of them are epistemolog-
ical concerns. First, it is argued that knowledge of the (psychological, pathological, biologi-
cal, etc.) mechanisms intervening in clinical response to treatment is ussually limited: some 
mechanisms are unknown, and those effectively identified are often only partially under-
stood (Howick, 2011). A second problem is that the mechanisms involved in clinical re-
sponses are always part of a progressively more comprehensive system of mechanisms oper-
ating in lower or higher levels of fundamentality, but the precise way in which they affect/
constraint the relevant mechanisms in a mechanistic explanation is usually very hard to de-
termine. Finally, metaphysical concerns about the stochastic nature of some mechanisms 
have also been raised (see Howick (2011)).
On the other hand, many argue against the superiority of RCTs over mechanistic rea-
soning. Usually, they claim that both are complementary and equally good sources of ev-
idence. Besides all the referred objections to the reliability of RTCs, the preferred line of 
defense of mechanistic reasoning relies on the difference between causation and mere cor-
relation:
It is a truism that correlation is not causation, but attempts to spell out what distinguishes 
causal correlations from accidental ones have not been particularly successful. MTC [mechanical 
theory of causation] meets this deficiency by requiring that two events are causally related if and 
only if those events are connected by a mechanism. (Glennan, 1997, p. 509)
This is the idea behind the so-called Russo-Williamson Thesis: both mechanistic reasoning 
and RCT are needed to establish causal claims, because “if there is no plausible mechanism 
from C to E, then any correlation is likely to be spurious” (Russo & Williamson, 2007, 
p. 159). They offer both historical and theoretical support for this thesis. It is also advo-
cated by Gillies (2010) in the case of the claim that smoking causes heart disease. A similar 
point was made by Cartwright & Munro (2010) in relation to the problem of external va-
lidity.
Arguments for and against EBM’s claim about the superiority of RCTs over mech-
anistic reasoning show many complexities, but we take the demand of explanation to 
be the central issue at stake. While EBMers believe that a well established experimen-
tal correlation is enough evidence for the effectiveness of an intervention, advocates of 
mechanistic reasoning hold that a more or less precise account of the relevant mecha-
nisms involved in the causal connection between the intervention and the experimen-
tal outcome is required for the correlation to count as good evidence. They demand a 
mechanistic explanation of what is inside RCT’s black box. For that reason, despite 
the arguments from both sides being empirically informed, the problem does not seem 
to have a definitive empirical (or empirically informed) solution. Even the best-estab-
lished correlation (by an RCT meeting a set of preferred standards) could be seen as 
sufficient evidence for a causal claim (related with the effectiveness of a clinical inter-
vention) by an EBMer, and as insufficient evidence for believing the same claim by an 
advocate of the Russo-Williamson Thesis. Thus, they would form different doxastic 
attitudes towards a proposition that maintains a given intervention is effective (say, 
one of them believe it while the other suspends her judgment), given the same body of 
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evidence. We only need to assume they are epistemic peers that (correctly) assessed the 
evidence in the best way possible to have an instance of The Weight of the Evidence 
Case.
3.3. Scientific and meta-scientific disagreement
We have presented the EBM case as an instance of WEC, that is, as an example of how a 
variation in epistemic perspective renders a steadfast response to a scientific dispute rea-
sonable. However, some might worry about this being a case of metascientific disagree-
ment in the philosophy of science instead of a disagreement about first-order scienti-
fic facts. A possible reason for this worry could be that what motivates the disagreement 
seems to be a philosophical difference regarding the value of explanation. It would be of 
no help to point out that this is a factual disagreement, given that many meta-scientific 
disagreements are factual as well. We will not discuss meta-scientific disagreement in this 
paper (we have examined disagreements about scientific ontology in Borge (2021)). How-
ever, we present in this section reasons for regarding the EBM case as one of scientific dis-
agreement.
For a start, the disagreement in the EBM case does not have two usual and dis-
tinctive features of meta-scientific disagreements. First, disagreements of this kind are 
about philosophical questions regarding science (or at least some aspect of it) as an 
epistemic enterprise: its aims, commitments, methods, and/or epistemic power. Sec-
ond, meta-scientific disagreements usually do not have significant impact in the way 
scientists work in the laboratory. Consider the dispute about scientific realism. The 
debate confronts (among other contenders) standard scientific realists (who believe 
that the unobservable entities postulated by our best scientific theories exist) with 
constructive empiricists, who maintain that reliable scientific knowledge is limited to 
what theories say about the observable phenomena. In this case, the disagreement con-
cerns scientific ontology (endorsement or rejection of existence claims about unob-
servable entities such as electrons), the aim of science (approximate truth or empirical 
adequacy), the reliability of Inference to the Best Explanation, and the type of knowl-
edge we can reasonably expect to get from science (knowledge about both the observ-
able and unobservable parts of the world, or just about the former). Additionally, 
disputes about scientific realism have little or no impact in the laboratory life. Two 
scientists can work in exactly the same way using Coulomb’s law to design an exper-
iment, even if they disagree about the degree of ontological commitment that should 
be assumed towards electrostatic force, natural necessity, or the law itself. By contrast, 
the target of the disagreement in the EBM case is a proposition about an object of sci-
entific inquiry (i.e. the efficacy of a specific medical intervention) and not about the 
aims, commitments, or epistemic features of science itself. Moreover, unlike what hap-
pens in cases of meta-scientific disagreement, the disagreement about a causal claim 
backing the efficacy of an intervention has direct and relevant consequences in scien-
tific practice.
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that deciding when a proposition in dispute is about 
a first-order scientific fact or about a meta-scientific issue is not always a straightfor-
ward task. Sometimes, the line between scientific and meta-scientific disagreement is 
blurry, and it is reasonable to think that the distinction is a matter of degree. There 
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are paradigmatic cases of the two types of disagreement, but there may be cases in 
which both scientific and meta-scientific matters are jointly at issue. For the reasons 
given above, we think the disagreement in the EBM example is not one of them. But 
even if we are wrong, the fact that first-order scientific facts and meta-scientific is-
sues are together at stake in a dispute does not necessarily mean that we should treat 
it simply as a meta-scientific disagreement in the philosophy of science. Weinberger 
and Bradley have shown that many well known examples of scientific disagreements 
derive from “broader methodological or foundational differences between the com-
munities” [2020, p. 43]. However, the authors emphasize the scientific character of 
these disputes, and recommend being “skeptical of any claim that scientific debates 
can be traced back to debates between proponents of different philosophical theories” 
[2020, p. 41].
4. How to be steadfast
In section 3, we described The weight of the evidence case (WEC), that we distinguished 
from typical cases of scientific disagreement in which the dispute is solved by seeking fur-
ther evidence. We showed that in WECs scientists frequently remain steadfast, and we 
tried to motivate this idea by presenting the EBM case, which we believe prompts the de-
sired intuitions. In this section, we will strengthen the case by providing a normative argu-
ment in support of our view.
4.1. Epistemic perspectives
Our discussion of WECs in 3 made it clear that when assessing the rationality of rival 
hypothesis scientists take into account not only evidence, which not always suffices to 
settle the issue, but also several theoretical values (hierarchically ordered according to 
their preferences) as well as different stances concerning the status of different types of 
facts as evidence, the relative weight of various kinds of evidence and maybe some privi-
leged epistemic goals.16 We refer to this set of epistemic policies as the epistemic perspec-
tive of a subject. Thus, an epistemic perspective in the present sense consists in a policy 
for forming beliefs, more specifically, a policy for determining the rational doxastic atti-
tude towards a proposition as a function of the features previously mentioned.
Given the importance that the notion of shared epistemic perspective will have in the 
rest of this work, it will be helpful to specify the conditions under which two agents hold 
the same epistemic perspective.
Shared epistemic perspective Two agents S and T hold the same epistemic perspective 
when they (a) pursuit the same epistemic goals, (b) embrace the same hierarchy of values as the 
most adequate for achieving their epistemic goals, and (as a result of that) (c) share the same 
epistemic policies for determining the maximally rational doxastic attitude to take towards a 
16 The precise relationship between a hierarchy of values and the achievement of epistemic goals is a com-
plex issue that falls beyond the limits of this work.
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proposition (as a function of the available evidence, the hierarchy of values, and the preferred 
epistemic goals).
In addition, we make two assumptions about epistemic perspectives. Our first assumption 
is about the best way of representing the interaction between the different epistemic per-
spectives of a subject. In this regard, we assume that some epistemic perspectives are funda-
mental for a given subject, i.e. there is no other perspective that she uses to determine the 
epistemic merits of that perspective (e.g. its rationality or its accuracy). A motivation for 
the existence of fundamental perspectives can be found in Field (2000).17 He claims that 
attributing an epistemic perspective to someone consist in making an idealization based 
on her behaviour. The issue is then determining which is the best idealization. On the one 
hand, one can adopt a view according to which there is a hierarchy of epistemic perspec-
tives which ends up in a fundamental one. The alternative is attributing to the subject dif-
ferent perspectives of the same level, that she alternatively uses to evaluate each other.18 
Field comments:
But there is an obvious weakness in an idealization of the latter sort: it is completely unin-
formative about what the agent does when the rules conflict. There is in fact some process that 
the agent will use to deal with such conflicts. Because this conflict-breaking process is such an 
important part of how the agent operates, it is natural to consider it a rule that the agent is fol-
lowing. If so, it would seem to be a basic rule, with the ‘multiple rules’ really just default rules 
that operate only when they don’t come into conflict with other default rules. (Field, 2000, 
p. 390)19
The second assumption, inspired on Lewis’ discussion of inductive methods (Lewis, 
1971), imposes a condition on reasonable epistemic perspectives.20 Lewis notices, in 
the first place, that in order to choose an inductive method, one needs to use an induc-
tive method. This is because the choice of an inductive method has to be based on the 
estimated accuracy of such method, which can only be determined using an inductive 
method. Second, he claims that inductive methods can be either modest or immodest. 
An inductive method is immodest if it estimates that it is at least as good as any of its ri-
vals at leading to truths and avoiding errors. This means that it doesn’t recommend any 
method over itself. By contrast, a modest inductive method sometimes recommends 
some other methods over itself. Third, he argues that it is unreasonable to use a modest 
inductive method, for it cannot be coherently followed: suppose that inductive method 
17 See also Lynch (2010) and Pittard (2019) for views that assume the existence of fundamental meth-
ods. The assumption that there are some epistemic methods that we treat as fundamental is also pres-
ent in the literature on hinge epistemology (e.g. Ranalli (2018)). We leave discussion of this literature 
for future work.
18 An anonymous reviewer suggests a third possibility, namely that the subject treats different perspec-
tives as fundamental in different contexts, depending on what best serves her interests. As we will see 
below, this is compatible with our view that steadfastness is sometimes rationally permitted, as long as 
it is granted that there are some contexts in which there can be peer disagreements involving epistemic 
perspectives that the subjects treat as fundamental.
19 Our use of ‘fundamental’ is equivalent to Field’s use of ‘basic’ in this paragraph.
20 To be sure, we do not claim that this is a sufficient condition but only a necessary one.
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A recommends believing P, while inductive method B recommends believing ¬P. If, in 
addition, A recommended following B, then it would recommend, on the one hand, be-
lieving P, and, on the other hand, believing ¬P.21 For reasons analogous to Lewis’, we 
maintain that fundamental epistemic perspectives are either modest or immodest, and 
that it is unreasonable to hold a modest fundamental epistemic perspective, since such a 
perspective could not be coherently followed.
Let’s sum up our view on epistemic perspectives. Epistemic perspectives are methods 
for determining the rational attitude to hold towards any proposition given the available 
evidence, a set of theoretical values (hierarchically ordered according to the preferences 
of the subject) as well as different stances concerning the status of a given fact as evidence, 
the relative weight of various kinds of evidence and maybe some privileged epistemic goals. 
Some perspectives are fundamental for a subject, in the sense that there is no more basic 
epistemic perspective that she uses to assess that perspective’s epistemic status. Moreover, 
since in order to determine the estimated accuracy or rationality of a certain perspective she 
needs to use a perspective, by Lewis’ argument, reasonable fundamental epistemic perspec-
tives are immodest.
4.2. Different kinds of disagreement
Now that we have made the notion of an epistemic perspective a bit more precise we can 
make more fine grained distinctions concerning epistemic peerhood and peer disagree-
ments. First, we distinguish strong and weak epistemic peers. Strong Epistemic Peers 
are Epistemic Peers (namely, they are evidential and cognitive equals) who share an epis-
temic perspective, which they apply in a similar way. Weak Epistemic Peers are Epis-
temic Peers who do not share their epistemic perspectives, or that do not apply their 
epistemic perspectives in a similar way. In parallel, there are at least two kinds of disa-
greement. Weak Peer Disagreements (WPD) are disagreements between strong epis-
temic peers, while Strong Peer Disagreements (SPD) are disagreements between weak 
epistemic peers.
As we saw in section 3, scientific disagreements are frequently resolved by exposing 
mistakes or inconsistencies in the way of interpreting the evidence or just by looking for 
new evidence. On our terminology, these are are instances of WPDs. We already noted 
that consideration of these cases suggests some sort of conciliatory attitude in scientists. 
By contrast, the scientific disagreements that we denominated WECs fall under the defi-
nition of SPD: they are due neither to cognitive failure nor to ignorance on the part of 
the subjects but to differences concerning their basic methods for determining which is 
the most rational hypothesis. In those cases, the dispute could emerge because scientists 
prioritize different theoretical values or epistemic goals, because they have different ways 
of weighting the evidence, distinct explanatory demands or different ways of employing 
their epistemic perspectives. In those cases, we will argue, to be steadfast is rationally per-
missible.
21 Immodesty might also be problematic, for it seems that a method’s self-recommendation is not epis-
temically significant.
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4.3. An argument for steadfastness
In order to argue for a steadfast view, let’s reconsider the case we discussed in section  3. 
There, we saw that EBMers and advocates of the Russo-Williamson thesis adopt different 
epistemic perspectives relative to different theoretical values and some preferred epistemic 
goals. Both views look like good candidates for fundamental epistemic perspectives. These 
views set different demands of explanation when it comes to reliably determining the ex-
istence of a causal relation, but there doesn’t seem to be any shared meta-perspective that 
the parties in the discussion could use to determine which perspective is preferable. To set-
tle the issue, one should compare both views and see which one is better at determining 
causal relations. But in order to do that you need a perspective that establishes how strin-
gent your demands should be for believing that a genuine causal relation has been spotted. 
This is exactly what EBM and the Russo-Williamson thesis are about. This suggests that it 
is not possible to settle this issue in a way that abstracts form the the perspectives involved. 
Thus, the disagreement between EBMers and defenders of mechanistic explanations can be 
thought of as a SPD involving fundamental perspectives, so that there is no meta-perspec-
tive that could be appealed to in order to determine empirically which of the perspectives 
in dispute is better.
We want to argue that SPDs involving fundamental epistemic perspectives such as that 
between EBMers and defenders of mechanistic views (fundamental SPDs) allow the par-
ties in the dispute to rationally retain their attitudes, that is, they permit a steadfast reac-
tion. To see why, we show that in SPDs the standard arguments in favor of conciliationism 
(from rationality and from accuracy, see section 2) can be blocked. Recall that we followed 
Lewis in arguing that reasonable epistemic perspectives are immodest, i.e. they always es-
timate that they are at least as accurate or rational as other incompatible ones, on pain of 
incoherence. This already suggests a tendency to prioritize one’s epistemic perspective. 
Immodesty by itself does not suffice to secure a steadfast reaction, however. Even if each 
party’s perspective is immodest, they could both appeal to a higher-level shared perspective 
to settle the disagreement. And in many cases they will just do that. However, when the 
disagreement is over their fundamental epistemic perspectives, there is no shared meta-per-
spective that they could use to resolve the conflict. This is what we saw in the disagreement 
between EBMers and defenders of mechanistic explanations, where the subjects could not 
approach the disagreement but from their own perspectives. Consequently, faced with 
such a disagreement they will evaluate the merits of their perspective as well as that of their 
opponent’s perspective by using their own perspective.
Together, these two facts (the fundamental character of the perspective and its im-
modesty) support the conclusion that each subject can rationally retain her own epistemic 
perspective, and therefore her own belief on the matter. It follows from the fundamental 
character of the perspectives that each subject uses her own perspective in assessing which 
perspective is better. It follows from the immodesty of the perspectives that each perspec-
tive, if it is a reasonable one, estimates that it is at least as good as its alternatives. The latter 
means that either it estimates that it is at least equally accurate or rational to their alterna-
tives, or that it is more accurate or rational than its alternatives. In the former case, the sub-
ject is obviously rational in maintaining her original attitude. In the latter case, however, it 
is also rationally permissible for the agent to retain her own perspective, and consequently, 
her own doxastic attitude, since adopting the rival’s perspective would make no difference 
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as to the accuracy or rationality of the subject’s belief. Either way, we can conclude that it 
is rationally permissible for them to retain their original attitudes in the face of disagree-
ment.22, 23
To better understand the way in which the conciliationist argument is blocked by the 
previous considerations, recall that both versions of the argument depended upon the prin-
ciple of Independence. In section 2, we characterized evidence from peer disagreement as 
higher-order evidence, namely evidence that one’s initial assessment of the evidence is on 
the wrong path. As we saw, according to the conciliationist argument higher-order evi-
dence from peer disagreement can constitute a defeater for the subject’s belief. Crucially, 
though, this is only in so far as Independence is in force. This principle states that one 
should assess the epistemic merits of one’s opponent’s attitude independently of the rea-
soning behind one’s initial belief. However, if we are correct SPDs about fundamental epis-
temic perspectives show that this principle does not hold in general: in those cases, scien-
tists cannot solve the disagreement by appealing to a shared background perspective, and 
they cannot judge the merits of the rival’s view but from their own perspective. Thus, in 
assessing their rival’s view scientists have some sort of epistemic blindspot: they cannot 
step out of their perspective and see things from a different one.24 Now, since both argu-
ments for conciliationism require Independence, they are blocked by the previous consid-
erations.25 In other words, higher-order evidence from peer disagreement has no defeating 
force in these cases.
The kind of evidence we have considered so far is not the only kind of higherorder ev-
idence there is, however. Straßer et al. (2015) distinguish between two different kinds of 
higher-order evidence, content-based indices and form-based indices. The former concerns 
22 Our account is compatible with the idea that it is possible to rationally change one’s fundamental per-
spective based on non-epistemic reasons, like prudential or pragmatic reasons.
23 Notice that, as defined, immodesty does not foreclose the possibility that a subject recognizes an incom-
patible epistemic perspective as equally accurate or rational to her own. Now, one might have doubts that 
this is reasonable. One could hold that a subject cannot rationally believe there are two (or more) equally 
rational fundamental epistemic perspectives, while rationally holding either. For example, by analogy 
with White’s (2005) arguments, one could claim that if the subject recognized an incompatible perspec-
tive as equally rational to her own, then the choice about what perspective to adopt, and therefore about 
what to believe, would be arbitrary, and arbitrariness would preclude the agent from being epistemically 
rational. If this or some other argument to the same conclusion proved to be correct, immodesty would 
be stronger than we defined: an immodest epistemic perspective would estimate that it is more accurate 
or rational than its alternatives. This would make our argument stronger: steadfastness would not only 
be permitted in fundamental SPDs but required. However, since this idea is controversial and we do not 
need it to secure the desired conclusion (namely, that agents are rationally permitted to be steadfast in 
some scientific disagreements), we stick to the formulation given above.
24 Thus, our view could be understood as a normative argument for what Straßer et al. (2015) denomi-
nate the enstatic view, at least regarding cases where the perspectives under question are fundamental. 
According to the ecstatic view, in turn, scientists can go back and forth from different epistemic per-
spectives, judge things from the rival’s perspective and recognize whether her view is rational.
25 Schoenfield (2014, p. 202) argues for a similar position in this regard: “This is just a fact about epis-
temic life that we have to live with: the methods that we use to evaluate evidence are not the sorts of 
things we can give independent justification for.” We agree with the general idea, but we argue that 
this fact holds only for our fundamental methods, not for any method.
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the argumentative content of the dispute. This includes the kind of things we have already 
discussed: different preferences regarding epistemic values (e.g. simplicity over complete-
ness), different methodological standards, etc. The latter, in turn, concerns structural prop-
erties of the controversy, like the length of the debate, the number of experts involved on 
each side of the disagreement and the expertise of the participants.
We already argued that in fundamental SPDs content-based indices do not defeat the 
subject’s belief. What about form-based indices? According to Straßer et al., form-based 
indices signal that the views on both sides of the debate are the product of rational delib-
eration. Consequently, the parties involved have to be epistemically tolerant, that is, they 
should admit the opponent’s view as potentially rational (although they consider it ob-
jectionable in important ways) while assuming the commitment to engage critically with 
the rival position and, eventually, to modify theirs, should it be required. Crucially, this 
is compatible with our view. As we discussed in section 2.2, our argument for steadfast-
ness works within a synchronic, individual approach to epistemic rationality that focuses 
on attitudes like belief or credence. The argument for epistemic tolerance, in turn, is best 
understood within a diachronic, collective approach involving attitudes like endorsement 
or acceptance. It is coherent to deny, on the one hand, that form-based indices defeat the 
subject’s belief in fundamental SPDs and maintain, on the other hand, that they require 
recognizing the rival’s attitude as potentially rational. Thus, it is coherent to defend a 
steadfast view for fundamental SPDs while recognizing the need of epistemic tolerance in 
collective inquiry.
Now, there has been some discussion in the literature concerning fundamental dis-
agreements. Lynch (2010) and Pittard (2019), for example, advocate views in the same 
spirit as ours. Both of them focus on disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles 
or epistemic starting points (what we have called strong disagreements). Their arguments, 
however, have different scope. Lynch argues that these disagreements are epistemically 
irresolu ble.26 Roughly, the reason is that when it comes to disagreements over fundamen-
tal epistemic principles there is no epistemic reason that either party could offer to her op-
ponent that does not presuppose the reliability of her own preferred principle. Hence, nei-
ther party is capable of putting forward reasons that the other party is able to recognize 
as epistemic reasons. For Lynch, discussions over fundamental principles are unavoidably 
epistemically circular. Lynch’s view goes in the same direction as ours, but there are some 
substantive differences. Crucially, his argument does not differentiate between peer disa-
greements and disagreements between experts and non-experts, while our argument is in-
tended to apply only to the former cases. Furthermore, Lynch’s conclusion depends upon a 
notion of rational resolvability (Ranalli, 2018) that we have not discussed here, and about 
which we would like to remain neutral.
Pittard (2019) also provides an argument for a similar conclusion as ours, within a 
Bayesian framework. He maintains that the Equal Weight View requires Instrumental-
ism, the view that one should treat the output of one’s cognitive system as readouts of a 
complex instrument. Instrumentalism requires that agents conditionalize on the evidence 
supplied by those readouts using her estimated reliability on the proposition and a prior 
credence that is rationally antecedent to the readout in question (Pittard, 2019, p.  13). 
26 He does not focus specifically on cases of peer disagreement, but his argument applies to those cases.
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However, he claims that agents cannot take an instrumentalist stance to all of their doxas-
tic attitudes. When it comes to a fundamental view p, a so-called ur-prior, there is simply 
no prior probability on p that is not informed by the agent’s readouts on p. Furthermore, 
he maintains that imposing the additional condition that the estimation of one’s own re-
liability on a fundamental matter be based only on considerations that are independent 
of the proposition under discussion (that is, a condition similar to Independence) leads to 
problems (Pittard, 2019, p. 18). He concludes that there is much less pressure to conciliate 
when it comes to fundamental issues than in ‘superficial’ disagreements. Pittard’s argument 
goes in the same direction as ours. In this case, however, our argument is more general: 
since we do not assume a Bayesian framework, a specific way for conditionalizing on evi-
dence or the thesis of Instrumentalism, we believe that our argument extends more easily to 
different epistemic frameworks.
To end up, we address a possible objection. The objection says that the argument we 
gave is unacceptably question-begging. It goes as follows: conciliationists arguably think 
that Conciliationism itself is part of our fundamental epistemic perspectives. If so, then it 
is not true that some SPDs are such that there is no higher-order epistemic perspective that 
could be used to settle the issue. We can always appeal to Conciliationism itself. To assume 
otherwise is to assume that Conciliationism is not part of our fundamental epistemic per-
spective, and that begs the question against Conciliationism.
Our answer is twofold. First, although some conciliationists might argue that Concili-
ationism itself is part of our fundamental epistemic perspectives, this is not essential to the 
view. There is nothing in principle incoherent about a conciliationist view that does not 
treat Conciliationism as part of our fundamental epistemic perspectives. If this is correct, 
the argument does not beg the question against conciliationism. Second, there are inde-
pendent reasons to maintain that Conciliationism is not part of our fundamental epistemic 
perspective. Elga (2010) argues that a coherent fundamental inductive method cannot in-
clude Conciliationism, because it would be self-undermining in cases of disagreement over 
Conciliationism itself. While discussing Elga’s view, Pittard (2015, p. 446) concurs: “Elga 
is right, I think, in maintaining that a coherent and reasonable inductive method can-
not include a uniform conciliatory policy that applies to all disagreements, including disa-
greements over the policy itself. So any conciliationist who thought that a peer’s credence 
should always be given equal weight, for example, stands refuted.” In the same line, Reining 
(2016, p. 311) concedes that cases of peer disagreement over Conciliationism face the con-
ciliationist with an epistemic dilemma, in which she is rationally required not to be concil-
iatory.
In answer to this problem, Pittard argues for a specific version of Conciliationism, 
 Resolute Conciliationism, according to which the conciliatory rule is to be thought of 
as a default rule, that is, a rule that is mandatory unless one encounters evidence of its 
unreliability or it violates some rational requirement. Reining, for his part, argues for 
pro tanto Conciliationism, where peer disagreement is considered to be a reason for 
modifying one’s attitude, but one that can be outweighed by other reasons. In both 
approaches, conciliationism should not be applied in every circumstances, hence the 
self-undermining problem is blocked. But to be sure, in neither of these accounts Con-
ciliationism is part of a fundamental perspective, since it can be overruled in certain cir-
cumstances.
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Given all of this, we can say that although there could be a version of Conciliationism 
that regards it as part of our fundamental epistemic perspectives, this view is not essential 
to Conciliationism and it faces important challenges.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we analyzed a concrete case of scientific disagreement, namely that between 
EBMers and supporters of mechanistic reasoning. First, we motivated the intuition that 
this kind of scientific disagreements allow for a steadfast reaction. Then, we characterized 
this case as a disagreement between subjects with different fundamental epistemic perspec-
tives. After identifying the main components of epistemic perspectives and laying out some 
reasonable assumptions about them, we introduced a distinction between weak and strong 
peer disagreements. Then, we provided a normative argument for the view that fundamen-
tal strong peer disagreements such as the one between EBMers and advocates of mechanis-
tic reasoning allow for a steadfast reaction. In a nutshell, the argument is that, given the im-
modest nature of fundamental epistemic perspectives, Independence has not bite in those 
cases, so typical arguments for conciliation are blocked.
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